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Abstract
This paper focuses on the reallocation of labour resources in a New Keynesian environment
with labour market search and endogenous separations. We show that the introduction of variation
in hours per worker alters the incentives for intertemporal substitution in a way that generates a
more steeply downward sloping Beveridge curve and reduces the tendency to synchronize gross
job flows. We find that the impact of labour supply elasticity on the slope of the Beveridge curve
and the correlation of gross job flows is determined primarily by variation in the response to
monetary shocks. When hours variation is suppressed, the correlation of job creation with job
destruction and that of unemployment with vacancies are strongly positive in response to monetary
shocks. With variation in hours both measures of reallocation take on the correct negative sign.
KEYWORDS: job reallocation, unemployment, hours, labour market fluctuations, New Keyne-
sian macroeconomics
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1 Introduction
Recent research extends the New Keynesian paradigm to incorporate labour
market search, motivated by the explicit account it provides of unemployment.1
Following Shimer (2005) and Hall (2005), who argue that unemployment dy-
namics are driven by fluctuations in outflows not inflows, the bulk of the
literature holds the inflow (separation) rate constant.2 Yet, subsequent empir-
ical evidence indicates that variation of inflows also plays an important role in
unemployment dynamics.3 This makes a model with endogenous separations
a natural starting point.
Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) develop a Schumpeterian model of labour
market dynamics, which features restructuring through endogenous separa-
tion of the least productive matches. In this literature on restructuring, the
slope of the Beveridge curve (correlation of unemployment with vacancies)
and the synchronization of gross job flows (correlation of job creation with job
destruction) are critical measures of the reallocation process. Both are neg-
ative in US data. Suppressing inflow variation, i.e. following Shimer (2005),
avoids the positive correlation of job flows and generates a downward sloping
Beveridge curve; however, it does so by assuming away reallocation decisions.
The Schumpeterian perspective on business cycles suggests that recessions
are the best time to undertake microeconomic restructuring, since the op-
portunity costs of doing so are low. Mortensen and Pissarides (1993) show
that a temporary shock to profitability produces strong positive correlation
of gross job flows and an upward sloping Beveridge curve, in the context of a
(constrained) eﬃcient equilibrium labour market search model with endoge-
nous separations (one which satisfies the Hosios condition). Krause and Lubik
1Authors have examined the role played by labour market search, and wage rigidities
in determining dynamic behaviour of unemployment, output and inflation. In so doing
they address the amplification and persistence puzzles highlighted by Shimer (2005), Chari,
Kehoe and McGrattan (2000), Cogley and Nason (1995).
2This literature includes Moyen and Sahuc (2005), Christoﬀel and Linzert (2005),
Christoﬀel et al. (2006), Jung and Kuester (2006), Trigari (2006), Faia (2007), Kuester
(2007) and Thomas (2007).
3Elsby et al. (2007) show that Shimer’s result, that unemployment inflows are invariant
over the cycle, is overstated even using his own data and methodology. Davis et al. (2006)
and Fujita and Ramey (2007a) present evidence from job flows and other data sources to
support the view that inflows are an important component of unemployment dynamics at
business cycle frequencies, accounting for up to a third of the variation in unemployment.
1
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(2007) find a similar eﬀect in a New Keynesian framework when, as in the
Mortensen-Pissarides model, labour input varies on the extensive margin(s)
only. However, it is possible to reconcile models of reallocation and restruc-
turing with the US stylised facts, while adhering to the Hosios condition, by
incorporating additional features into firms’ decision problems so as to alter
the incentives for intertemporal substitution. For example, Mortensen (1994)
achieves this by introducing on-the-job search and distinguishing between job
and worker flows, while Den Haan et al. (2000) do so by including capital
accumulation.
This paper examines the reallocation of labour resources in a New Keyne-
sian environment with labour market search and endogenous separations. We
show that the introduction of variation in hours per worker alters the incen-
tives for intertemporal substitution in a way that generates a downward sloping
Beveridge curve and reduces the tendency to synchronize gross job flows.4 The
New Keynesian framework imposes the discipline of general equilibrium on our
analysis. It introduces frictions in price setting which permits meaningful dis-
cussion of the impact of both productivity and monetary shocks.5 We show
that the eﬀect of labour supply elasticity on the slope of the Beveridge curve
and the correlation of gross job flows is determined primarily by changes in the
response to monetary shocks. Specifically, under inelastic labour supply, both
the correlation of job creation with job destruction and that of unemployment
with vacancies are strongly positive in response to monetary shocks, whereas
under elastic labour supply both measures of reallocation take on the correct
negative sign. The volatility of unemployment is relatively high with or with-
out hours variation. The introduction of hours variation actually raises the
volatility of unemployment, but reduces that of vacancies. Vacancies fail to
exhibit suﬃcient persistence and are too strongly correlated with job creation.
4As a by-product, this also produces a positive correlation of hours and employment
at business cycle frequencies. Fluctuations in hours per worker account for a substantial
proportion of the variation in labour input at business cycle frequencies, Cho and Cooley
(1994). Despite its role in labour input, variation of hours per worker is frequently omitted
from models with labour market search, presumably on grounds of parsimony.
5Shimer (2005) notes that an upward sloping Beveridge curve arises when exogenous
shocks to the (aggregate) job destruction rate are permitted - this may be interpreted as an
aggregate reallocative shock. It is possible that a suitable choice of correlation of reallocative
shocks and productivity shocks could generate a Beveridge curve with the appropriate slope.
However, Davis and Haltiwanger (1999) are unable to find a clear and important role for
such aggregate reallocative shocks. For this reason it is more interesting to examine whether
a negatively sloped Beveridge curve can arise when job destruction varies endogenously
in response to aggregate productivity and money supply growth disturbances, which are
standard in a New Keynesian setting.
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Moreover, variation in hours reduces the volatility of wages, but this remains
too high.
The mechanism by which variation in hours per worker aﬀects reallocation
is relatively straightforward. Variation of hours per worker allows existing
matches to adjust labour input to shocks by varying hours as well as through
separations - firms equate marginal costs of factor adjustment across each mar-
gin. This extra flexibility alters rents, and, as a consequence, the incentives
both to dissolve existing matches and to create new ones. Labour adjustment
on the extensive margin is attenuated and the tendency to synchronize cre-
ation and destruction activity is also reduced. One potential problem is that
variation on the intensive margin may worsen the volatility puzzle highlighted
by Shimer (2005) by substituting for variation on the extensive margin and
attenuating fluctuations in unemployment. However, our calibration strategy
adjusts parameters to maintain the standard deviation of job destruction con-
stant across experiments, so that unemployment volatility remains roughly
constant; in fact, it increases slightly when hours can vary.
The sensitivity of reallocative measures to variation in hours is enhanced
by the presence of monetary shocks. It is costly to dissolve existing matches
or create new matches in response to transitory shocks, yet hours variation
within existing matches does not entail long-run considerations. Since mon-
etary shocks are less persistent than productivity shocks, the introduction of
hours variation has its greatest eﬀect on the response to monetary shocks.
Nonetheless, even for productivity shocks, realistic hours variation alters the
incentives for intertemporal substitution suﬃciently to produce a negative job
flows correlation.
Krause and Lubik (2007), Trigari (2005), Braun (2006), Walsh (2005) and
Andres et al. (2006) incorporate endogenous separations into the New Keyne-
sian treatment of unemployment. These authors all provide the same rationale
and broadly address the same issues as considered in the literature which as-
sumes a constant separation rate (see footnotes (1) and (2)). For the most
part, they do not address questions on the timing of reallocation that we con-
sider and that a model with endogenous job destruction is designed to answer.
In particular, the joint behaviour of the Beveridge curve and the correlation of
gross job flows is considered only by Krause and Lubik (2007), who, as noted
above, find both measures of reallocation to be positive, in an environment
with endogenous job destruction and labour input variation on the extensive
margin only.6
6Krause and Lubik also find that the introduction of (complete) wage rigidity can pro-
duce a downward-sloping Beveridge curve, but they are unable to avoid positively correlated
3
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The combination of endogenous hours along with endogenous job destruc-
tion that we discuss below was introduced by Trigari (2005). Our principal
contribution is to demonstrate the eﬀect of realistic hours variation on mea-
sures of reallocative activity. We also illustrate the role of diﬀerent shocks
in determining the eﬀect of hours variation on reallocation. Trigari does not
directly consider the correlation of gross job flows, nor does she attempt to
match the behaviour of unemployment or vacancies. Nonetheless her impulse
response analysis is likely to be consistent with the eﬀects of hours variation
on reallocation that we outline here.7 We use a simplified version of Trigari’s
model to compare the behaviour of measures of reallocation obtained under
diﬀerent assumptions about labour supply elasticity. Our focus on contrasting
the impact of particular (implicit) assumptions on hours variation in a rela-
tively simple New Keynesian model leads us to calibrate rather than estimate
the elasticity of hours directly. It also means that we take a stand on the
shocks that aﬀect the economy and match unconditional moments. Although
not immune from criticism, this strategy facilitates comparison with Krause
and Lubik (2007) and Walsh (2005); Trigari (2005) considers the (conditional)
response to monetary shocks alone.8
Walsh (2005) was the first to integrate a New Keynesian model with labour
market search and endogenous job destruction. Following from Den Haan et
al., he does not allow variation in hours per worker and does not consider mea-
sures of reallocation at all. Andres et al. (2006) extend Walsh’s model.9 They
find a role for price rigidity in determining the variability of unemployment,
vacancies and labour market tightness. Although they do not compute the
slope of the Beveridge curve, it can be inferred from the results they present.
For the version of their model (without capital and distortionary taxation)
which most closely approximates ours, it is -0.08: negative but much smaller
than in US data, just as we find when we suppress variation in hours. They
do not display any data for the volatility of gross job flows or related measures
gross job flows. Indeed, they are unable to match the Beveridge curve if wage rigidity is set
to match observed wage volatility.
7Trigari (2005) estimates key parameters so as to match the impulse responses of job
flows, employment, hours, inflation and output to an interest rate shock.
8A natural extension of our approach, which imposes formal statistical discipline, would
be to estimate the relative importance of the shocks using a full information approach, as
in the treatment of a model with exogenous job destruction provided by Jung and Kuester
(2007). Given the diﬃculties we find in capturing the behaviour of vacancies, we avoid this
latter approach.
9Their benchmark model also allows for habit persistence, capital accumulation and
distortionary taxes.
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of reallocation, which we consider here.10 Our analysis suggests that because
they suppress variation in hours per worker, the correlation of gross job flows
would be positive but that this can be corrected by allowing hours varia-
tion. Our results diﬀer from theirs both because we allow variation in hours
per worker and because we permit monetary as well as productivity shocks.
Braun (2006) applies Trigari’s methodology to worker flows rather than job
flows; she considers a New Keynesian framework with capital accumulation.
We consider a New Keynesian model without capital accumulation. While
capital can help discipline model calibration, much early work in the New Key-
nesian tradition both for structural modelling and policy analysis suppresses
this margin, see Gali (2003), Woodford (2003), as does more recent work with
unemployment, Blanchard and Gali (2006), Christoﬀel and Linzert (2005),
Faia (2007), Trigari (2005). The main justification (often implicit) for this
simplification appears to be the limited role played by capital accumulation.11
Our omission of capital accumulation and other intertemporal features, such
as habit persistence, serves to highlight the role of the intensive margin.12
The model is outlined in Section 2. Calibration and solution method are
summarised in Section 3. Section 4 presents and discusses the results. Section
5 concludes. An appendix contains details of the data used, and the calibration
strategy.
2 Model
The economy contains four types of agent: intermediate good producers, final
goods producers, households and a government. Production of the intermedi-
10In addition, direct comparison between our results and those of Andres et al. (2006) is
complicated by the fact that they appear only to calibrate idiosyncratic shocks and the prop-
erties of the productivity shock in the benchmark case, and proceed to allow the variability
of job destruction and output to vary across experiments.
11In the literature on unemployment dynamics, Hagedorn and Manowskii (2005) point
out that match-level profits are an important determinant of the amplitude of fluctuations
in unemployment and vacancies. Krussell et al. (2005), surveying developments in that
literature, comment that the calibration of this critical profit share parameter could be
improved if capital accumulation were incorporated as a disciplining device, but Jung (2005)
demonstrates that the introduction of capital accumulation does not overturn the insight of
Hagedorn and Manowskii (2005).
12An earlier version of this paper, Holt (2006), modelled capital accumulation. The
results on the role of hours variation are similar to those displayed below. Hence a New
Keynesian environment with capital accumulation does not necessarily alter incentives suﬃ-
ciently to generate a negative job flows correlation, contrary to the real business cycle based
analysis of Den Haan et al (2000).
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ate good requires labour. Labour can be varied on both extensive and intensive
margins. Hours worked while employed are determined through Nash bargain-
ing rather than unilaterally by individual workers. The strength of variation
in hours per worker is determined by preferences over leisure (the elasticity
of labour supply). The model structure is based on that of Trigari (2005).
We simplify her model in several ways in order to highlight the role of hours
variation and facilitate comparison with the literature. Firstly, we omit habit
persistence to simplify the dynamic structure of the model. Secondly, we tar-
get the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) estimate of average unemployment
(6%) rather than the high (25%) unemployment she uses. The high steady
state unemployment rate that she assumes acts to stabilize the unemployment
pool and hence vacancies in response to shocks, while our assumption makes
it easier to match observed unemployment volatility. Thirdly, in the light of
evidence of instability of the interest rate rule that she employs for monetary
policy over our sample period, we follow Krause and Lubik (2007) and adopt a
money supply growth rule. Fourthly, we adopt idiosyncratic production costs
rather than idiosyncratic preference shocks, which is slightly more intuitive
in the light of our interest in reallocation based on profitability. Finally, we
specify preferences over leisure, following Andolfatto (1996), rather than hours
worked as is common in the New Keynesian literature. Below we discuss the
decision problem of households, the specification of goods and labour markets
and the equilibrium characterization of the economy.
2.1 Households
Assume that the economy contains a continuum of identical households of
unit mass. Each household is a family with a continuum of members. In
equilibrium some family members are employed while others are unemployed.
Each member i, of family f has the following period utility function defined
over consumption, C, money balances MP and hours, H,³
Cfi,t
´1−φ
1− φ +
ΥM
P
1− ξ
Ã
Mfi,t
Pt
!1−ξ
+
¡
1− IUit
¢
ΥH
³
1−Hfi,t
´1−ϕ
1− ϕ + I
U
it
(1− e)1−ϕ
1− ϕ
Here φ, the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, ϕ, the curva-
ture of utility derived from lesiure, ξ, the income elasticity of money demand,
ΥM
P
, the relative weight on money balances in the utility function, ΥH , the
relative weight on leisure during employment and e, the time spent under-
taking search when unemployed are all positive constants. IUit is an indicator
6
The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, Vol. 8 [2008], Iss. 1 (Topics), Art. 21
Brought to you by | University of Edinburgh
Authenticated | 129.215.19.188
Download Date | 6/7/13 4:45 PM
function taking the value 1 if the individual i is unemployed at date t and
zero otherwise. To avoid the distributional issues that arise through diﬀering
employment histories, we assume that family members perfectly insure each
other against (cross-section) variation in the marginal utility of consumption.
Separability of the individual’s utility in consumption, money balances and
leisure, ensures that family members have identical consumption and money
holdings. Under these simplifying assumptions, the decisions of household
members can be analyzed in terms of a representative household.13 The rep-
resentative household chooses consumption and money balances to maximize
the expected utility of its members over their lifetimes:
E0
⎡
⎣X
t=0
βt
⎡
⎣
(Ct)1−φ
1−φ +
ΥM
P
1−ξ
³
Mt
Pt
´1−ξ
+
ΥH
R 1−Ut
0
(1−Hi,t)1−ϕ
1−ϕ di+ Ut
(1−e)1−ϕ
1−ϕ
⎤
⎦
⎤
⎦ .
Here β, is the discount factor and Ut represents the fraction of the household
membership which is unemployed (we suppress the household superscript, f ,
for convenience). Hours of work during employment are determined through
bargaining between the individual worker and the firm rather than being uni-
laterally determined by the household, see below.
Households own all firms. They can save by holding 1-period interest-
bearing bonds, or non interest-bearing money balances. The representative
household maximizes members’ expected lifetime utility subject to the follow-
ing sequence of constraints
PtCt +RntBt +Mt = It +Bt−1 +Mt−1 + PtTt, t ≥ 0. (1)
Here Bt represents holdings of a nominal 1-period bond at the end of period t,
and Rnt represents the gross nominal interest rate on this bond. Mt represents
holdings of nominal money balances, PtTt represents lump-sum nominal trans-
fers. Ct is a composite index of final goods consumption. It is the household’s
nominal income (household labour income, plus the household’s share of firms’
profits net of expenditures on vacancies).14
The solution to the representative household’s problem is characterized
by first-order conditions for bond holdings, Bt, consumption, Ct and money
balances, Mt. Substituting the first order condition for the shadow value of
13This sort of assumption is a common simplification in the literature on business cycle
fluctuations under labour market search designed to facilitate tractability, see e.g. Andol-
fatto (1996), Merz (1995).
14Under the representative family assumption, all families hold the same share of firms’
profits, so in equilibrium this share is one at all dates.
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wealth using the marginal utility of consumption in the remaining conditions
we have:
1 = βRnt Et
"
Pt
Pt+1
µ
Ct
Ct+1
¶φ#
. (2)
ΥM
P
µ
Mt
Pt
¶−ξ
− βEt
∙
C−φt+1
Pt
Pt+1
¸
= C−φt (3)
2.2 Goods and Labour Markets
2.2.1 Labour Market Flows
Production of the intermediate good takes place in matched firm-worker pairs,
or, for notational ease, matches. The match specific production, bargaining
and separation decisions described below depend on the probability that un-
employed workers find jobs and the probability that vacancies are filled. Here
we define these probabilities and the associated labour market flows.
Define the number of matches at the beginning of period t as Nt ∈ [0, 1].
Following the literature, we allow some job destruction in the form of quits,
which are assumed exogenous and independent of the match-specific profitabil-
ity. We capture this by allowing a fraction, λx, of matches to separate prior to
the realization of period t shocks. Subsequently, shocks are realized, including
an idiosyncratic cost shock, X, drawn from distribution F (X) and a match
may choose to break up if the value of the match surplus is negative. Let the
X¯t denote the threshold value of the cost shock, so that higher realizations
of idiosyncratic costs cause matches to separate. Endogenous separation thus
occurs with probability λn
¡
X¯t
¢
= 1−
R X¯t dF (X) = 1− F ¡X¯t¢. The overall
separation rate in period t is
λt = λ
x + (1− λx)
¡
1− F
¡
X¯t
¢¢
. (4)
Variation in the separation rate arises through changes in the threshold
value of the idiosyncratic cost shock, X¯t. We model matching frictions using an
aggregate matching function. Matching occurs at the same time as production.
Assume that there is a continuum of potential firms, with infinite mass, and
a continuum of workers with unit mass. Unmatched firms choose whether or
not to post a vacancy and incur a cost κ per period. Free entry of unmatched
firms determines the size of the vacancy pool. Define the mass of firms posting
vacancies in period t as Vt. Let the mass of searchers, unmatched workers, be
Ut. All unmatched workers may enter the matching market in period t - even
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if their match dissolved at the start of period t, so
Ut = 1− (1− λt)Nt. (5)
New matches in date t begin production in date t+1, while unmatched workers
remain in the worker matching pool. The flow of successful matches created
in period t,Mt, is given by the constant returns matching function
Mt =MUγt V 1−γt . (6)
where γ ∈ (0, 1) is the elasticity of match creation with respect to unemploy-
ment andM > 0 is a scaling parameter. The number of employed workers at
the start of period t+ 1 is
Nt+1 = (1− λt)Nt +Mt. (7)
Denote the probability that a vacancy is filled in date t as
pVt =
Mt
Vt
, (8)
and the probability that an unemployed worker enters employment in period
t as
pUt =
Mt
Ut
. (9)
The gross job destruction rate is the number of employment relationships
that separate, less exogenous separations that rematch within the period as a
fraction of current employment
JDt =
λtNt − pVt λxNt
Nt
= λt − pVt λx. (10)
Gross job creation is the flow of new matches (as a fraction of existing employ-
ment) less matches due to firms filling vacancies that resulted from exogenous
separations
JCt =
Mt − pVt λxNt
Nt
=
Mt
Nt
− pVt λx. (11)
2.2.2 The Intermediate Sector
Production Production of the intermediate good takes place in matches.
Each match consists of one worker and one firm, who together engage in pro-
9
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duction until the employment relationship is terminated. By assumption, both
firms and workers may only participate in a single employment relationship at
any given time. Matches are subject to aggregate productivity and idiosyn-
cratic cost shocks, Zt and Xt respectively.15 Following Den Haan et al. (2000),
assume that idiosyncratic cost disturbances are serially uncorrelated. Date t
production occurs after realization of the date t shocks. At date t an ongoing
match (one facing idiosyncratic shock Xt < X¯t) produces
Y I (Xt) = AZtH (Xt) +F −Xt
units of intermediate good. The parameters A, a scaling factor, and F , the
steady-state expected idiosyncratic shock, are positive constants. Matches are
price takers and sell their homogeneous intermediate output at (nominal) price
P It . The formal separation of the job-destruction and price-setting decision
problems is maintained for tractability. It is consistent with the view that
prices are not set at the level of an individual match. Current profits of an
ongoing match are
ΠI (Xt) ≡
AZtH (Xt)
µt
+
F −Xt
µt
− W (Xt)H (Xt)
Pt
, (12)
where µt =
Pt
P It
is the markup of the index of final goods prices over the price
of the intermediate good (the reciprocal of marginal cost) and W (Xt) is the
match specific (nominal) wage. Notice that, for a given idiosyncratic cost and
holding other variables constant, a monetary expansion reduces the markup,
µt, because final goods prices do not immediately adjust in proportion to the
monetary innovation. As a result profits rise following a monetary shock.
Similarly, an increase in productivity, Zt, raises profits.
Value Functions Consider the value functions for firms’ and workers’ deci-
sion problems.
In equation (13), V Ut , the date t value of unemployment expressed in fi-
nal goods, comprises the consumption value of utility from search, plus the
discounted present value of ongoing unemployment next period, V Ut+1, and
the diﬀerence between the value of employment, V W (X), and that of unem-
ployment in the event that the worker matches this period (with probability
15Cost shocks are a natural way to model heterogenous productivity underlying the
process of creative destruction at the heart of the model. Trigari (2005) adopts a formally
equivalent but, given our interest in reallocation, arguably less appealing approach in which
the idiosyncratic disturbances aﬀect the utility derived from leisure.
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pUt ) and the match survives to produce in the next period (with probability
(1− λx)F
¡
X¯t+1
¢
):
V Ut =
(1− e)1−ϕ
1− ϕ C
φ
t
+βEt
"
Cφt
Cφt+1
∙
V Ut+1+
pUt (1− λx)
R X¯t+1 £V W (X)− V Ut+1¤ dF (X)
¸#
.(13)
Matching and production occur simultaneously, so that a match which is
formed in period t cannot produce until period t + 1, after aggregate and
idiosyncratic shocks have been realized. As a result a new match survives
with probability (1− λx)F
¡
X¯t+1
¢
.
Let V W (Xt) denote the date t value, expressed in terms of consumption
goods, to a worker, of employment in an ongoing match with idiosyncratic cost
shock Xt.
V W (Xt) =
W (Xt)H (Xt)
Pt
+ΥH
(1−H (Xt))1−ϕ
1− ϕ C
φ
t
+βEt
"
Cφt
Cφt+1
∙
V Ut+1+
(1− λx)
R X¯t+1 £V W (X)− V Ut+1¤ dF (X)
¸#
.(14)
The worker supplies H (Xt) hours of labour to the firm for real hourly wage
W (Xt)
Pt
. Both wage and hours are outcomes of a bargaining process - described
below. Hours worked generate income, but hours spent in the workplace re-
duce utility. These concerns are captured in the first two terms in (14). The
remainder of the date t value to an employed worker from the ongoing match
is the discounted present value, βEt
∙
Cφt
Cφt+1
V Ut+1
¸
, of unemployment plus the dif-
ference between the value of employment, V W (X), and that of unemployment
in the event that the match continues to produce in the next period (where
we sum across values of X which do not lead to termination prior to date t+1
production).
The date t value, V J (Xt), of a firm that forms part of an ongoing match
with current match specific shockXt, consists of current profits plus the appro-
priately discounted value to the firm of the sum of a date t+1 vacancy, V Vt+1, in
the event that the match terminates prior to production in period t+1 (where
termination occurs with probability λt+1 = λ
x+(1− λx)
¡
1− F
¡
X¯t+1
¢¢
) and
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the expected value in the event that the match continues to produce in t+ 1;
V J (Xt) = ΠI (Xt)+βEt
"
Cφt
Cφt+1
"
λt+1V Vt+1 + (1− λx)
Z X¯t+1
V J (X) dF (X)
##
.
Assume posting a vacancy costs κ per period. Then the value at date t of a firm
with an unfilled vacancy, V Vt , reflects the cost of posting that vacancy plus the
value, V Vt+1, of the firm in the event that it fails to fill the vacancy by date t+1
or else the event that the vacancy is filled but the match is terminated prior to
production in period t+ 1 (which occurs for a suﬃciently adverse realization
of the idiosyncratic shock, Xt > X¯t+1), and finally, the value, V J (X), in the
event that the vacancy is filled and the period t + 1 idiosyncratic cost shock
takes a value X ≤ X¯t+1, which does not lead to termination:
V Vt = −κ+ βEt
"
Cφt
Cφt+1
" ¡
1− pVt (1− λx)F
¡
X¯t+1
¢¢
V Vt+1+
pVt (1− λx)
R X¯t+1 V J (X) dF (X)
##
.
The standard free entry condition on vacancies drives the value of a vacancy to
zero, V Vt = 0, ∀t, so the Bellman equations for V J (Xt) and V Vt , respectively,
become:
V J (Xt) = ΠI (Xt) + (1− λx)βEt
"
Cφt
Cφt+1
Z X¯t+1
V J (X) dF (X)
#
(15)
κ = pVt (1− λx)βEt
"
Cφt
Cφt+1
Z X¯t+1
V J (X) dF (X)
#
. (16)
Moreover, using (15), we can re-write (16) as a Bellman equation for pVt :
κ
pVt
= β (1− λx)Et
"
Cφt
Cφt+1
Z X¯t+1 ∙
ΠI (X) +
κ
pVt+1
¸
dF (X)
#
. (17)
Bargaining: Hours and Wages We assume that for each match engaged
in production, the firm and worker adopt Nash bargaining over both hours
worked and the hourly wage. Given the full consumption insurance against
unemployment risk provided by our family structure, some care is required
to ensure that this problem is well defined. We discuss this issue first before
turning to the outcome of the bargaining process.
Assume that workers evaluate the consequences of their actions on the
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basis of the contributions these make to their family’s lifetime utility. Then
the worker’s surplus from employment, V W (Xt) − V Ut is the same as the
value (in terms of consumption) of the change in the family’s utility from
having one more additional member in employment, ∂Ωt∂(1−Ut) · C
φ
t . That is
V W (Xt) − V Ut = ∂Ωt∂(1−Ut) · C
φ
t , where Ωt is the representative family’s value
function. To check this, note that we can write Ωt recursively as
Ωt =
⎡
⎣
(Ct)1−φ
1−φ +
ΥM
P
1−ξ
³
Mt
Pt
´1−ξ
+
ΥH
R 1−Ut
0
(1−H(Xi,t))1−ϕ
1−ϕ di+ Ut
(1−e)1−ϕ
1−ϕ
⎤
⎦+ βEt
£
Ωt+1|X ≤ X¯t+1
¤
subject to the date t constraint in (1), and the evolution equation for the
number of individuals engaged in production:
1− Ut+1 = [1− λt+1] [1− Ut] + pUt [1− λt+1]Ut.
Computing the derivative with respect to (1− Ut) we find
∂Ωt
∂ (1− Ut)
·Cφt =
W (Xt)H(Xt)
Pt
−ΥH (1−H(Xt))
1−ϕ
1−ϕ C
φ
t +
(1−e)1−ϕ
1−ϕ C
φ
t +¡
1− pUt
¢
β (1− λx)Et
∙
Cφt
Cφt+1
R X¯t+1 £V W (X)− V Ut+1¤ dF (X)¸
Combining equations (13) and (14) we find that this equals V W (Xt)−V Ut , as
required. So a worker’s threat point in the bargaining process is well defined in
terms of household welfare. The problem of the division of the match surplus,
S (Xt) = V W (Xt)− V Ut + V J (Xt)− V Vt = V W (Xt)− V Ut + V J (Xt) , (18)
on a period by period basis can then be written as:
max
W (Xt),H(Xt)
£
V W (Xt)− V Ut
¤η £
V J (Xt)− V Vt
¤1−η
.
The first order conditions for hours and wages respectively are
ηV J (Xt)
(1− η)
∙
W (Xt)
Pt
−ΥH
(1−H (Xt))−ϕ
C−φt
¸
= −
( ¡
V W (Xt)− V Ut
¢ ·h
AZt
µt
− W (Xt)Pt
i ) ,
(19)
ηV J (Xt) = (1− η)
¡
V W (Xt)− V Ut
¢
. (20)
Combining (19) and (20) we write optimal hours worked in terms of date t
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flow variables as:
ΥH
(1−H (Xt))−ϕ
C−φt
= ΥH
(1−Ht)−ϕ
C−φt
=
AZt
µt
∀Xt ≤ X¯t. (21)
Equation (21) says that, under Nash bargaining, the marginal rate of substitu-
tion between consumption and hours worked is equal to the marginal product
of labour. Hours per worker in ongoing matches are decreasing in the markup,
but increasing in aggregate productivity. Since inflation is directly related to
the markup (see below), this equation is important in understanding the infla-
tion response of the model. Variation in hours per worker is decreasing in ϕ, so
choice of ϕ can be used to shut down the intensive margin in our experiments.
Finally, notice that hours per worker are independent of the match specific
shock: H (Xt) = Ht.16
Turning to optimal wages, we use the Bellman equations above to express
the wage as a function of date t flow variables. Recall that the worker’s surplus
from employment is
V W (Xt)−V Ut =
W (Xt)Ht
Pt
+ΥH
(1−Ht)1−ϕ
1−ϕ C
φ
t − (1−e)
1−ϕ
1−ϕ C
φ
t +¡
1− pUt
¢
β (1− λx)Et
∙
Cφt
Cφt+1
R X¯t+1 £V W (X)− V Ut+1¤ dF (X)¸ .
Using (20) and (16) it follows that the worker’s surplus can be written in terms
of current variables as
V W (Xt)− V Ut =
W (Xt)Ht
Pt
+ΥH
(1−Ht)1−ϕ
1−ϕ C
φ
t
− (1−e)
1−ϕ
1−ϕ C
φ
t +
η
1−η
¡
1− pUt
¢
κ
pVt
.
Lastly, combining (15) and (16) allows the value of the firm to be written in
current variables
V J (Xt) =
AZtHt
µt
+
F −Xt
µt
− W (Xt)Ht
Pt
+
κ
pVt
.
So the optimal wage for a match with idiosyncratic cost realizationXt becomes
W (Xt)Ht
Pt
=
η
h
AZtHt
µt
+ F−Xtµt + κ
pUt
pVt
i
− (1− η)
h
ΥH
(1−Ht)1−ϕ
1−ϕ −
(1−e)1−ϕ
1−ϕ
i
Cφt
.
16An additive idiosyncratic shock avoids wide variation of hours across matches, Cooley
and Quadrini (1999).
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The first term within the first square brackets on the right hand side of this
equation represents the worker’s share of the market value of production, the
second term reflects the market value of idiosyncratic costs (relative to steady
state), and the third term reflects the impact of labour market tightness. The
remaining terms reflect the worker’s reservation wage. This equation reveals
that high idiosyncratic costs act to lower labour income. Also, other things
being equal, a rise in productivity, Z, raises labour income. A monetary
expansion tends to raise output and marginal costs, yet since the prices of
final goods do not adjust immediately, the markup, µt, falls. So a monetary
expansion also tends to raise labour income.
Finally, define aggregate labour income as WtHtPt = Ht
R X¯t W (Xt)
Pt
dF (X).
Then
WtHt
Pt
=
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
η
∙
AZtHt
µt
+ 1µt
∙
F −
U X¯t X dF (X)
F(X¯t)
¸
+ κ p
U
t
pVt
¸
− (1− η)
h
ΥH
(1−Ht)1−ϕ
1−ϕ −
(1−e)1−ϕ
1−ϕ
i
Cφt
⎫
⎪⎬
⎪⎭
F
¡
X¯t
¢
. (22)
Separation For values of the idiosyncratic cost shock above a certain thresh-
old level, X¯t, separation occurs. The condition S
¡
X¯t
¢
= 0, pins down this
threshold value of the match specific shock. Combining (18) and (20), V J (Xt) =
(1− η)S (Xt). So X¯t is determined by the condition V J
¡
X¯t
¢
= 0 :
AZtHt
µt
+
F − X¯t
µt
−
W
¡
X¯t
¢
Ht
Pt
+
κ
pVt
= 0.
This equation indicates that a job is destroyed when costs are suﬃciently high
that the value of production net of idiosyncratic cost shock and wage equals
the (expected) cost of posting a vacancy. Substituting for the match specific
wage, the threshold value X¯t is determined by
(1− η)
"
AZtHt
µt
+ F−X¯tµt
+
h
ΥH
(1−Ht)1−ϕ
1−ϕ −
(1−e)1−ϕ
1−ϕ
i
Cφt
#
− ηκp
U
t
pVt
+
κ
pVt
= 0. (23)
2.2.3 Final Goods Sector
Assume that there is a continuum of final goods producers, with unit mass.
Final good firm z acquires the wholesale good at price P It and costlessly trans-
forms it into the divisible final good z which is then sold directly to households
at price pt (z). Define Pt =
³R 1
0
pt (z)
1−ε dz
´ 1
1−ε
as the utility based price index
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associated with the consumption composites. The market for final goods is
characterized by monopolistic competition - ε represents the elasticity of sub-
stitution across varieties of final good. Aggregate demand for the final good
z in period t is ct (z). Aggregate supply of the final good z in period t is
yt (z). The optimal choice of consumption expenditures on final good z is then
ct (z) =
³
pt(z)
Pt
´−ε
Ct, where aggregate consumption, Ct =
³R 1
0
ct (z)
ε−1
ε dz
´ ε
1−ε
and aggregate final good output Yt =
³R 1
0
yt (z)
ε−1
ε dz
´ ε
1−ε
are composite indices
of final goods.
Frictions prevent the continual adjustment of final goods prices, which
follow a hybrid Calvo - style adjustment scheme. With probability (1− ω) a
final good producer can set the price of its output in period t. This probability
is independent of when the firm last adjusted price. Then the average price for
final goods producers who do not adjust their price is simply Pt−1. Define the
average price set by firms who do adjust price as p¯t. Since pure forward-looking
price adjustment schemes seem not to account adequately for observed inflation
dynamics, we employ a hybrid scheme (following Gali and Gertler (1999)).
Assume that a fraction (1− τ) of the final goods producers are forward-looking
and set prices optimally (to maximize expected discounted profits given the
probability of future adjustment). Define the price set by forward-looking
producer z at date t as pt (z). Since all forward-looking firms setting price at
date t face the same expected future demand and cost conditions, they choose
the same price, so pt (z) = p∗t , where
p∗t =
ε
1− ε
Et
P∞
s=0 ω
sβs C
φ
t
Cφt+s
³
p∗t
Pt+s
´1−ε
Yt+sP It+s
Et
P∞
s=0 ω
sβs C
φ
t
Cφt+s
³
p∗t
Pt+s
´1−ε
Yt+s
(24)
The remaining fraction, τ , of firms which reset price in period t are assumed
to set a price equal to the average of the prices reset in the previous period,
corrected for inflation, πt−1:
pbt = p¯t−1πt−1. (25)
The average price set in period t is p¯t =
h
(1− τ) (p∗t )
1−ε + τ
¡
pbt−1
¢1−εi 11−ε
, and
the aggregate retail price index evolves according to
P 1−εt = (1− ω) (p¯t)
1−ε + ωP 1−εt−1 . (26)
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2.3 Macroeconomic Policy and Exogenous Shocks
We set government spending to zero and assume that the government main-
tains a balanced budget by rebating seigniorage revenues to households in
the form of lump-sum transfers. The government budget constraint is thus
PtTt = Mt −Mt−1, where Mt is the aggregate money stock. Monetary policy
is specified by
Mt =Mt−1eυt (27)
where υt, the monetary shock, evolves according to the AR(1) process
υt = ρυυt−1 + ευ,t. (28)
The logarithm of aggregate productivity also follows an AR(1) process:
lnZt = ρZ lnZt−1 + εZ,t (29)
where εν,t and εZ,t are mutually and temporally independent mean-zero processes,
while ρZ and ρυ are positive constants.
2.4 Equilibrium
Under the representative consumer framework, household choices (superscript
f) are identical across households and in equilibrium Mft =Mt etc., in (1) to
(3). Aggregate income, It, comprises labour income, plus profits of final goods
producers, plus profits of intermediate goods producers (net of vacancy posting
costs) It = (1− λx)NtWtHt+PtΠFt +PtΠIt . Here, nominal profits of final goods
producers are PtΠFt =
R
pt (z) yt (z) dz − P It
R
yt (z) dz = PtYt − P It Y It , where
Y It = (1− λx)Nt
Z X¯t
0
[AZtHt +F −X] dF (X)− κµtVt (30)
denotes aggregate intermediate output net of vacancy posting costs.17 Nominal
intermediate good producers’ profit can be written as the sum of output net of
vacancy costs, less aggregate wage payments: PtΠIt = P
I
t Y
I
t −(1− λx)NtWtHt.
Using these insights and cancelling terms we find It = PtYt. In equilibrium,
when combined with the government budget identity, the household budget
17Note Y It =
R 1
0
yt (z) dz. Using the demand function for final good z: yt (z) =³
pt(z)
Pt
´−ε
Yt, we have Y It =
R 1
0
³
pt(z)
Pt
´−ε
Ytdz =
³
Pt
P˜t
´ε
Yt, where P˜t =
R 1
0
pt (z)
−ε dz, is
an auxiliary price index.
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Parameter Meaning Value
β Rate of time preference 0.99
ε Elasticity of substitution between goods 21
ω Probability of price non-adjustment 0.8
τ Fraction of backward-looking firms 0.5
ρZ Productivity shock autocorrelation 0.95
ρv Monetary shock autocorrelation 0.5
σv Monetary shock standard deviation 0.004
ξ (Income) Elasticity of money demand 1
ΥM
P
Scaling factor: utility of real balances 17
λ Separation rate 0.1
pU Probability of finding employment 0.61
pV Probability of filling a vacancy 0.7
M Scaling factor: matching function 0.654
λx Exogenous separation rate 0.068
JD Job destruction rate 0.052
µX Mean of idiosyncratic cost distribution -1.5
η Worker bargaining power 0.5
κ Cost of posting a vacancy 0.034
φ Elasticity of intertemporal substitution 1
H Hours per worker / total time endowment 0.33
e Hours of search per unemployed worker 0.0033
Table 1: Experiment-Invariant Parameter Values
constraint reduces to the aggregate (final) goods market equilibrium condition
Yt = Ct (31)
Thus the system of equations governing equilibrium in the economy consists
of the numbered equations (1) - (12), (17) and (21) - (31).
3 Data, Calibration &Model SolutionMethod
The data we use is discussed in the Appendix. We log-linearize the model
about its (zero-inflation, zero-growth) steady state and use stochastic simu-
lations to tease out the dynamic structure of the economy.18 Model solution
18The log-linear approximation to equation system (1)-(12), (17), (21)-(31) is solved
with MATLAB, 7.0.1, using McCallum’s (1999) undetermined coeﬃcients version of Klein’s
18
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requires calibration of parameters governing steady state values of labour and
goods market variables; nominal rigidity, and household preferences. We also
specify the processes governing idiosyncratic costs, aggregate productivity and
money supply growth. Parameter values which are invariant across experi-
ments are summarized in Table 1. The Appendix contains discussion of the
rationale for these choices and those concerning parameters which vary across
experiments.
4 Results
In this section we discuss evidence as to the impact of variation in hours
per worker on the strength and timing of reallocative activity and on other
standard macroeconomic aggregates.
We contrast the behaviour of a model variant in which hours variation is
suppressed (which represents the standard approach in models of labour mar-
ket search with endogenous job destruction) with that of a set up in which
the elasticity of labour supply, governed by the parameter ψ, is selected to
match the variation of hours in US data. To provide a fair basis of com-
parison, we hold constant across experiments both the standard deviation of
simulated output and the standard deviation of simulated job destruction rel-
ative to simulated output. To do this, we adjust the standard deviation of
productivity shocks to allow the standard deviation of (Hodrick-Prescott fil-
tered) model output to match the standard deviation of output in US data
(Hodrick-Prescott filtered GDP), which is 1.69%.19 The standard deviation
of idiosyncratic cost shocks is varied in order to match the volatility of job
destruction relative to that of output. These dimensions cannot be used for
falsification. Instead, we examine the ability of the model to capture two key
aspects of the strength and timing of reallocative behaviour: i) the Beveridge
curve and ii) the correlation of gross job flows. We explain the mechanism by
which variation in hours per worker improves the treatment of labour reallo-
cation. We also consider the operation of the labour market as captured by
the correlation of hours with employment, the behaviour of job creation and
vacancies and standard macroeconomic aggregates such as unemployment. Fi-
nally, we examine the robustness of the results to plausible variation in labour
supply elasticity and consider the role played by diﬀerent shocks.
(1997) generalized Schur decomposition method.
19We hold the autocorrelation of productivity shocks, both standard deviation and serial
correlation of money supply growth shocks, constant across these experiments.
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4.1 Reallocation and Hours Variation
Table (2) illustrates the role of labour supply elasticity (variation in hours) in
determining the nature of reallocation. Column (1) of Table (2) displays prop-
erties of US Data. The other columns of Table (2) correspond to a particular
model variant.20 For column (X >1), the entry in the row labelled ’Output,Y ’
indicates the volatility of output generated by the model (in Column (X)) rela-
tive to the volatility of output in US data. The next ten entries in column (X)
correspond to the volatility of some variable relative to that of output. The
final two entries in each column are serial correlation statistics for output and
inflation. The penultimate six simple correlation statistics capture aspects of
labour market activity.
Labour supply elasticity, H , is 1ψ
£
1−H
H
¤
= 2ψ , since in steady state H =
1/3. In the limit as ψ → ∞, H → 0, and variation in hours is eliminated.
Column (2) reports results for the model where labour supply elasticity is set
to a low value, 0.01, using ψ = 200. This suppresses hours variation which
allows our model to approximate the framework used by Krause and Lubik
(2007). Column (5) displays simulation results when labour supply elasticity
is set to match the volatility of hours observed in US data. This enables
our model to approximate the model of Trigari (2005). Columns (2) and
(5) report properties of the model under diﬀerent assumptions about labour
supply elasticity while subject to both monetary and productivity shocks using
the calibration strategy described above. The other columns are discussed in
Section (4.4).
With inelastic labour supply, it is not possible to generate the patterns
of reallocation found in the data, see Columns (1) and (2). The correlation
of unemployment with vacancies shows that Beveridge curve is almost flat
while the correlation of gross job flows is positive. This mirrors the finding of
Krause and Lubik (2007). It is exactly the eﬀect that one would expect, in the
light of the wider literature on reallocation under constrained eﬃcient search,
Mortensen and Pissarides (1993). This result may appear to confirm the dif-
ficulties of allowing for endogenous job destruction outlined in Shimer (2005).
Here, however, movements in job destruction arise endogenously through ag-
gregate productivity and monetary disturbances, rather than as the result of
(reallocative) shocks to exogenous job destruction which he discusses. Once
realistic variation in hours is permitted, the model is much better able to cap-
20All statistics (for model simulations and data) are computed from Hodrick-Prescott
filtered data. The business cycle statistics for model variants are computed by averaging
across 200 simulations. Each simulation contains 250 data points but the first 50 are omitted
when undertaking detrending and computing moments.
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Data
Inelastic Labour
ψ = 200
σX = 0.8
Elastic Labour
ψ = 2.25
σX = 0.23
Shock
Col. No. (1)
All
(2)
M
(3)
Z
(4)
All
(5)
M
(6)
Z
(7)
Standard Deviations
Output, Y 1.00 1.00 0.29 0.95 1.00 0.52 0.86
Inflation, π 0.21 0.40 0.72 0.34 0.28 0.21 0.31
Wage, W/P 0.52 5.95 13.31 4.48 1.65 1.64 1.66
Hours / worker, H 0.55 0.10 0.24 0.08 0.57 0.34 0.65
Employment, N 0.66 0.67 0.57 0.68 0.76 0.55 0.82
Unemployment, U 7.21 5.19 7.11 4.93 6.15 4.36 6.62
Vacancies, V 8.04 5.06 5.06 5.04 2.88 2.08 3.14
Tightness, U/V 15.02 7.73 2.67 8.08 7.69 5.54 9.69
Job Creation, JC 5.09 7.26 10.94 6.70 5.45 3.80 8.29
Job Destruction, JD 8.97 8.87 20.33 6.53 8.89 6.19 5.91
Job Reallocation, JR 4.27 7.52 15.27 6.12 4.31 2.92 4.69
Cross-Correlations
U, V -0.94 -0.15 0.96 -0.32 -0.37 -0.41 -0.36
JC, JD -0.41 0.74 0.90 0.71 -0.34 -0.39 -0.34
V, JC -0.03 0.86 0.98 0.86 0.61 0.61 0.62
U, JD 0.67 0.42 0.88 0.25 0.62 0.62 0.63
H,N 0.89 0.13 -0.11 0.21 0.24 0.08 0.24
U, π -0.65 -0.65 -0.97 -0.56 -0.95 -0.95 -0.95
Autocorrelations
Output: Y, Y−1 0.87 0.89 0.47 0.94 0.87 0.65 0.95
Inflation: π, π−1 0.57 0.59 0.49 0.64 0.84 0.84 0.84
Table 2: Business Cycle Statistics
All statistics computed from Hodrick-Prescott filtered series, smoothing parameter
1600. All model statistics are averaged across 100 simulations. Column (1): US
data, 1972:2 - 1993:4. Columns (3) and (6), labelled ‘M’: simulations use monetary
shocks only, where ρυ = 0.5, σu = 0.004. Columns (4) and (7), labelled ‘Z’:
simulations use productivity shocks only, where ρZ = 0.95 throughout,
σZ = 0.009, for Column (4) and σZ = 0.021 for Column (7). Columns (2) and
(5), labelled ‘All’: simulations use monetary and productivity shocks, where
ρυ = 0.5, σu = 0.004 and ρZ = 0.95 throughout, σZ = 0.009 for Column (2) and
σZ = 0.021 for Column (5).
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ture the direction of reallocation, see Columns (1), (2) and (5). However, the
strength of the relationship between unemployment and vacancies is not fully
captured since the Beveridge curve, while downward sloping, is not as steep
as that in the data. It is worth spending some time trying to understand
the mechanism by which variation in hours alters the incentives to create and
destroy jobs.
Firstly, notice that, from an accounting viewpoint, a rise in unemployment
can be achieved in a variety of ways including a rise in job destruction and
a fall in job creation, or by one of these in isolation with no change in the
other, by a fall in job creation combined with a smaller fall in job destruction
or even by a rise in job creation combined with a larger rise in job destruction.
The first of these cases would tend to give rise to a negative contemporaneous
correlation of job creation with job destruction. The last two of the cases
described here would tend to produce a positive contemporaneous correlation
of job creation with job destruction. Secondly, it is not clear that there should
be a strong association between the correlation of gross job flows and the slope
of the Beveridge curve. The relationship between the two will depend on the
extent to which high levels of vacancies are strongly associated with periods
of above average job creation and that to which periods of above average job
destruction are associated with periods of above average unemployment.
Now consider in detail the case where variation in hours is suppressed.
This is an environment in which the correlation of gross flows takes a diﬀerent
sign to the slope of the Beveridge curve. Separations are eﬃcient and job
destruction facilitates the creation of jobs, so the best time to create jobs is
at the point at which the opportunity cost of doing so is at its lowest, namely
when match level profits (rents) are low. For this reason job creation and
job destruction move together when hours variation is suppressed, see Column
(2), in contrast to US data, see Column (1). This correlation alone does not
enable us to distinguish whether a rise in unemployment is associated with a
fall in job creation combined with a smaller fall in job destruction or with a
rise in job creation combined with a larger rise in job destruction. However,
the positive correlation of job destruction with unemployment indicates that
the second of these mechanisms is at work in the model when hours variation
is suppressed. To see how the constrained eﬃciency of separations impacts
on the Beveridge curve when variation in hours is suppressed, notice that job
creation and vacancies move together very closely in Column (2), whereas
these variables appear virtually uncorrelated in US data, Column (1). Despite
the strong negative correlation of job creation with job destruction and that of
vacancies with job creation, unemployment and vacancies are less strongly cor-
related than in US data because job destruction is relatively weakly correlated
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with unemployment in the model compared to the data.
Next consider the environment in which ψ is set to match the volatility
of hours in US data, σH/σY (to achieve this we set ψ = 2.25, see Column
(5)). With realistic variation in hours, the model generates a positive cor-
relation between hours per worker and employment (albeit weaker than that
in the data). Hours per worker will thus be above average in an expansion,
as unemployment falls, and below average in a recession, as unemployment
rises. Variation in hours per worker reduces the extent to which rents vary in
response to shocks because match level rents are convex in hours per worker.
Other things being equal, increased variation in hours per worker is likely to
reduce the variation on the extensive margin. One might expect the introduc-
tion of realistic volatility in hours per worker to be associated with a decline in
job reallocation, where job reallocation, JRt is the sum of job creation and job
destruction: JRt = JCt+JDt.21 In particular, the response of job destruction
to shocks may be more muted when hours per worker can vary and insulate
the economy from the full reallocative eﬀects of any shock. The incentives for
vacancy and job creation (in response to a shock that raises unemployment)
may be attenuated for two reasons as a direct result of such a reduced response
of job destruction. Firstly, the reduced response of job destruction will leave
a larger number of ongoing matches, which may reduce the potential rents
available to new matches and consequently reduce job creation and vacancy
creation. Secondly, the response of job creation may be attenuated because
the probability of filling an open vacancy will fall, due to the reduction in the
size of the pool of unemployed workers (which follows from the more muted
response of job destruction). In addition, the job creation response is likely
to be attenuated, independently of any variation in job destruction, since the
flexibility of hours allows ongoing matches to respond to improved conditions
(as the economy moves back towards steady state following a shock).
Other things are not equal, however, since our calibration strategy holds
the variability of job destruction constant across experiments at the value
observed in US data, σJD/σY . This leaves the final eﬀect described in the pre-
vious paragraph, which is independent of any eﬀect on job destruction. So job
reallocation declines over and above the eﬀect due purely to decline in the cor-
21The standard deviation of job reallocation, σJR can be written as£
σ2JD + σ
2
JC + 2 · ρJC,JD · σJD · σJC
¤
, where ρJC,JD is the correlation of job creation
with job destruction. It is possible to generate a reduction in the volatility of job reallo-
cation simply through the decline in the correlation of job creation with job destruction;
indeed, there could even be an increase in the volatility of job creation and of that of
job destruction. However, in Table (2) it is clear that the decline in job reallocation is
associated with a decline in both ρJC,JD and σJC , while σJD is constant.
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relation of job creation with job destruction. Columns (2) and (5) confirm that
greater elasticity of hours reduces the variability of job creation, as would be
expected under the latter eﬀect. The shift in the timing of job creation alters
the correlation of gross job flows, so that, in response to a shock which raises
unemployment, job creation rises while job destruction falls, as in the data.
This occurs despite the fact that we require the economy to satisfy the Ho-
sios condition. Vacancies remain positively correlated with job creation when
hours display realistic variation (Column (5)) and the correlation is weaker
than with hours variation suppressed (Column (2)). By contrast, the corre-
lation of job destruction with unemployment is stronger in the variable hours
environment than with hours variation suppressed. It is this combination of a
higher correlation of job destruction with unemployment, and a lower corre-
lation of job creation with vacancies, which permits a negative correlation of
job creation with job destruction together with a negatively sloped Beveridge
curve. The Beveridge curve, however, remains shallower than required by the
data.
Nevertheless, the joint behaviour of vacancies with job creation is one area
in which the variation of hours does not really get close to matching US data.
In US data there is virtually no relationship between the job creation and
the number of open vacancies, yet as just discussed, even with realistic hours
variation the model generates a positive correlation between vacancies and job
creation. This reflects the lack of persistence in vacancies (not displayed in
Table (2)): in US data the first order serial correlation coeﬃcient for vacancies
is 0.92, while in the model with hours variation it takes the value 0.08.
4.2 Hours Variation and Macroeconomic Aggregates
It is important to understand whether the improvement in the account of real-
locative activity provided by realistic hours volatility leads to a deterioration
of other aspects of model performance. Here we provide a brief summary of the
other properties of the model. As indicated in the introduction, some of these
issues have been discussed by Trigari (2005) for the model with elastic hours
variation andWalsh (2005), Krause and Lubik (2007) and Andres et al. (2006)
for the case where variation is suppressed. Rather than repeat their detailed
analysis of the mechanisms present, we highlight the impact of hours variation
on the volatility of unemployment, vacancies and the Beveridge curve.22
22Trigari (2005) and Walsh (2005) discuss the role of labour market search and matching
frictions in enhancing the persistence of inflation and output in response to shocks (com-
pared to a standard New Keynesian framework with a frictionless Walrasian labour market).
Trigari (2005) outlines the impact of variation on the extensive margin for the behaviour of
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In contrast to the results of Shimer (2005), who finds that the volatility of
unemployment is only one tenth of that in US data, we find that the model
generates unemployment volatility that is at least 75% of that in the data. This
is true regardless of the elasticity of hours per worker. In fact unemployment
volatility is higher when hours are elastic.
Andres et al. (2006) argue that this mainly reflects the presence of nom-
inal rigidities in the New Keynesian model. As Walsh (2005) observes, if
one holds the standard deviation of idiosyncratic shocks (and other parame-
ters) constant, then an increase in nominal price setting frictions will raise
the amplitude and persistence of output fluctuations. The intuition is that
the introduction of nominal rigidities flattens the supply curve and raises the
output response to shocks at the expense of price adjustment. This explains
the impact of price stickiness on unemployment pointed out by Andres et al.
(2006), Since unemployment volatility will increase with that of output.
In Andres et al., however, i) the standard deviation of output varies across
experiments and ii) the standard deviation of job flows appears to be cali-
brated only in the benchmark case so that it too can vary across experiments.
Since both output and job destruction variability are held constant across
our experiments, their mechanism can not explain why unemployment volatil-
ity rises in our model as variation in hours is introduced (see Columns (2)
and (5)). Instead, as the volatility of job destruction is held constant across
experiments, the change in unemployment volatility reflects the fact that un-
employment is less strongly correlated with job destruction in the inelastic
labour supply case. The decline in the use of the extensive margin, associated
with the introduction of variable hours, therefore shows up as a reduction in
the volatility of vacancies (and also in the volatility of job creation). As it
happens, the volatility of labour market tightness is unaﬀected, see Columns
(2) and (5). These results suggest that, if we insist on adjusting parameters
to hold the volatility of job destruction constant, there may still be some role
for more standard resolutions of the unemployment-vacancies-tightness puz-
zle, such as wage rigidity or low worker bargaining power (departures from the
marginal cost, while Walsh (2005) demonstrates that output and inflation persistence can
be enhanced by the introduction of habit persistence in consumption and by increasing the
strength of frictions in nominal price setting. Krause and Lubik (2007) provide evidence
that the unemployment-vacancy-tightness volatility puzzle identified by Shimer (2005) can
be resolved by incorporating real wage rigidity through an ad hoc wage norm. Andres et al.
(2006) argue that (in conjunction with habit persistence in consumption, capital accumu-
lation and distortionary taxation) the frictions in price setting in a New Keynesian model
make it possible to solve the unemployment - vacancy - tightness variability puzzle without
resort to either wage rigidity, as in Shimer (2005), or departures fron the Hosios condition
as in Hagedorn and Manowskii (2005).
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Hosios condition).
The serial correlation of output is not greatly aﬀected by the introduction
of hours variation and is close to its value in US data. Model-generated infla-
tion displays greater persistence than US data once realistic hours variation is
admitted. This acts to synchronize the movements in inflation and the already
persistent unemployment, which raises the correlation of inflation and unem-
ployment, or equivalently the slope of the Phillips curve. Increased inflation
persistence is associated with lower inflation volatility, which is closer to the
value in US data when hours per worker can exhibit realistic variation than
when this is suppressed. To understand the volatility of inflation, note that
the first order condition for hours,
ΥH
(1−Ht)−ϕ
C−φt
=
AZt
µt
,
can be rearranged to give an expression for marginal cost, µ−1t , as a function of
hours worked (as well as consumption and productivity). Given our assump-
tions on the nature of price adjustment, inflation depends on the discounted
present value of future marginal costs (and lagged inflation). In the inelastic
case, ψ = 200, so even though hours do not vary a great deal, the size of ψ
makes marginal cost, and hence inflation, sensitive to small variation in hours.
This leads inflation to be more variable with hours variation suppressed.
The same is true for wages. The wage equation reflects a role for variation
in µ−1t as well as an eﬀect through the term in the disutility of hours worked
(1−Ht)1−ϕ, which exhibits substantial variation for high values of ψ. How-
ever, even with elastic variation in hours per worker, wages are three times
more variable than in the data. This may suggest scope for the introduction
of wage rigidity.
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4.3 Robustness to Labour Supply Elasticity
A labour supply elasticity of 0 is implicit in studies in the labour market search
literature that rely only on the extensive margin for adjusting labour input.
Our preferred model is calibrated to a labour supply elasticity of 0.9 (i.e.
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Figure 1: Role of Labour Supply Elasticity
ψ = 2.25) in order to match the volatility of hours per worker. Conditional on
the structure of the model and our calibration strategy, this is the "correct"
ψ. However, a range of ψ ∈ [0, 1], is supported by empirical evidence, Blundell
and MaCurdy (1999). Here we briefly consider the sensitivity of our measure
of reallocative and other macroeconomic activity in our model to alternative
values of ψ. We consider values of H ∈ [0.01, 1]. Our results are summarized
in Figure (1). In constructing this Figure we adjust the standard deviation
of productivity shocks to hold the volatility of output constant and adjust
the standard deviation of idiosyncratic shocks to hold the volatility of job
destruction constant at their respective values observed in US data. Panel
(a) displays measures of reallocation and other correlations relating to labour
market flows. Panels (b), (c) and (d) show, among other things, the volatility
of unemployment, labour market tightness, job creation and vacancies. In the
light of our earlier discussion we interpret Figure (1) in terms of the eﬀect of
raising labour supply elasticity. For comparison, Table (2) column (1) provides
values for the statistics in US data.
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Increases in labour supply elasticity raise the volatility of hours (see panel
(d)). This increase occurs relatively smoothly as elasticity increases, yet, for
many variables there is a relatively sharp change in behaviour at low labour
supply elasticities, and these metrics are nonlinear non-monotonic functions
of the elasticity of labour supply.
Panel (a) shows that there is a dramatic decline in the correlation of job
creation with job destruction at very low levels of labour supply elasticity,
bringing it closer to US data. A further, more gradual improvement occurs at
higher levels of labour supply elasticity. Although a labour supply elasticity of
around 0.1 minimizes the slope of the Beveridge curve (at about -0.7), a rela-
tively high level of labour supply elasticity, near that required to match hours
volatility, is needed if the model is to match the correlation of job creation
with job destruction.
Panel (b) shows that the largest changes in unemployment volatility and
vacancy volatility occur at low levels of elasticity. Panels (a) and (b) shows
that the rise in unemployment volatility is associated with a rise in the cor-
relation of job destruction with unemployment (recall that the variability of
job destruction is held constant). The decline in vacancy volatility reflects the
decline in reallocative activity associated with increased variation in hours.
This eﬀect of labour supply elasticity is also seen in the initial decline in the
volatility of job creation at low elasticities in panel (d). For elasticities above
around 0.3 the variability of job creation is close to that in the data, see Table
(2) column (1).
Panel (c) shows that, at low levels of labour supply elasticity, the correlation
of hours with employment is negative, so that hours per worker substitute for
employment. Only at higher levels of elasticity, which are required to match
the volatility of hours, does this correlation become positive. In our model
it never attains values close to those seen in the data. Panel (d) shows that
the volatility of inflation is relatively constant, declining slightly as labour
elasticity rises. Panel (c) shows that the correlation of unemployment with
inflation, the slope of the Phillips curve, is close to the value in the data at low
elasticities but becomes steeper at high elasticities. This is due to increased
inflation persistence (associated with lower wage variability), which acts to
synchronize inflation and unemployment adjustment. Under Nash-bargained
wages, the model never manages to match the low variability of real wage
in the data, see panel (d) and Table (2) column (1). However, low levels
of labour supply elasticity lead to a large increase in the volatility of wages,
since for inelastic labour supply, any variation in hours requires more extreme
movements in wages.
Although the improvements associated with the introduction of variation in
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hours per worker do not rely on very elastic parameterization of labour supply,
a relatively high labour supply elasticity is needed to match the volatility of
hours and the correlation of job creation with job destruction and to obtain a
positive correlation of hours with employment.
4.4 The Eﬀect of Real and Nominal Shocks
Finally, we use stochastic simulation and impulse response analysis to examine
the role of diﬀerent shocks in determining the impact of variation in labour
supply elasticity on reallocative activity. Our simulation results are summa-
rized in Columns (3), (4), (6) and (7) in Table (2). We deliberately avoid
re-calibrating to match features of the data, as our aim is to show the role
of individual shocks in the overall response. Column (3) reports the eﬀect
under inelastic labour supply of allowing monetary shocks (labelled ’M’ in Ta-
ble (2) and calibrated as in Table (1)), while suppressing productivity shocks.
Column (4) reports the eﬀect under inelastic labour supply of allowing pro-
ductivity shocks (labelled ’Z’ in Table (2) and calibrated as in Column (2) of
Table (2)), with monetary shocks suppressed. Columns (6) and (7) report the
same experiments for the elastic labour supply version of the model (using the
calibration of column (5) of Table (2)).23 Figures (2) and (3) document im-
pulse response functions for inelastic and elastic labour supply versions of the
model (using the parameter values summarized in Table (1) and Table (2)). In
these Figures, impulses are one percentage point deviation from steady state
rather than one standard deviation, in order to facilitate comparison across
diﬀerent shocks and elasticities of labour supply.
4.4.1 Monetary Shocks
Notice from Table (1) that monetary shocks exhibit less persistence than pro-
ductivity shocks. Figures (2) and (3) confirm the relative lack of persistence
of the eﬀects of a monetary shock in comparison to a technology shock. We
argue that this diﬀerence is key to understanding the eﬀect of labour supply
elasticity on measures of reallocation and other variables.
From Columns (3) and (6) of Table (2), we see that monetary shocks ac-
count for a lower fraction of output variation with inelastic labour supply than
23Our approach requires that we take a stand on the number of shocks and their proper-
ties. A natural extension of our approach which imposes formal statistical discipline would
be to estimate the relative importance of the shocks using a full information approach.
Given the diﬃculties of matching the behaviour of vacancies we avoid this latter approach.
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Figure 2: Inelastic Hours Impulse Responses to 1% Shocks
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Figure 3: Elastic Hours Impulse Responses to 1% Shocks
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in the elastic case. To understand this recall that when adjusting to shocks,
firms equate the marginal cost across each margin. This means that in the
inelastic environment, where the cost of adjusting hours is high, the intensive
margin is likely to be used to lesser extent than in the elastic hours environ-
ment, so that firms will be more reliant on the extensive margin. Simulation
results in Columns (3) and (6) of Table (2) confirm this and the same eﬀect is
revealed by comparison of the hours and unemployment responses to monetary
shocks in panels (b) and (d) of Figures (2) and (3). If firms make use of the
extensive margin to adjust to shocks, then long-run relationships must either
be created or destroyed. Of course it will be particularly costly to adjust to
temporary shocks in this way. For this reason monetary shocks will account
for a relatively small component of output fluctuations in the inelastic hours
case.
Regardless of our assumptions about supply elasticity, firms will tend, in
the short-run, to make greater use of job destruction rather than job creation
to respond to shocks, since the latter activity is more costly. Panels (e) and (f)
of Figures (2) and (3) confirm this. Now, for the inelastic hours case, consider
a monetary shock that leads to a fall in job destruction and unemployment
(as illustrated in Figure (2)). The deviation of output from steady state in
response to a monetary shock is relatively short-lived (compared either with
the eﬀects of a productivity shock, Figure (2) Panel (a), or with a monetary
shock in the elastic hours environment, Figure (3), panel (b)). It seems likely
that a monetary shock does not greatly raise the value of creating a newmatch,
and the shock itself generates little incentive to raise the number of vacancies.
At the same time, the fall in the fraction of unemployed workers in Figure (2)
panel (d) reduces the probability of filling a match, and this acts to reduce the
number of vacancies. Taking these eﬀects together, vacancies and job creation
will be below average at the very point in time when job destruction and
unemployment are low, see Figure (2) panels (d) and (f). This generates a
positively sloped Beveridge curve and a positive correlation (synchronization)
of gross job flows as in Column (3).
By contrast, when hours can vary, this margin can be used more cheaply to
adjust to shocks. Reversing our previous argument, this enables (transitory)
monetary shocks to play a greater role in accounting for output variability
than in the inelastic case. For example, compare the output responses in
panel (b) of Figures (2) and (3).24 As discussed in Section (4.1), the response
24Notice that the standard deviation of monetary shocks is set independently of labour
supply elasticity, so this is an alternative way to understand the contribution of monetary
shocks as labour supply elasticity varies that we observed in Columns (3) and (6) of Table
(2).
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to monetary shocks under elastic hours aﬀects rents in a way that reduces
the economy’s reliance on the extensive margin, desynchronizes job flows and
generates a downward sloping Beveridge curve, see Column (6). This insight is
confirmed in Figure (3) panels (d) and (f), where unemployment and vacancies
move in opposite directions in response to monetary shocks, as do job creation
and job destruction.
Finally, note that the impulse responses to a monetary shock, as described
in Figure (2), are similar to those in Krause and Lubik (2007), in their Figure
(2). Our responses exhibit slightly less persistence than Krause and Lubik’s.
This may be because, even in the inelastic case we consider, costly hours vari-
ation feeds through to inflation (recall our equation (21) for optimal hours),
whereas the limit case they consider eschews any such link to inflation. The
responses in our Figure (3), the elastic hours case, are similar to those obtained
by Trigari (2005), see her Figures (4) and (5) on the quantitative importance
of intensive and extensive margins and on labour market dynamics on the ex-
tensive margin, respectively (note that she considers a monetary contraction).
The key diﬀerence between our Figure (3) and her Figure (5) lies in the va-
cancy response: she finds that after initially moving in the opposite direction to
unemployment (as in our Figure (3), vacancies subsequently exhibit the same
sign as unemployment. This may be a result of the changes in the timing of
adjustment introduced by her limited information assumption.25 Her Figure
(4) gives a relatively greater role to employment fluctuations over hours varia-
tion than our Figure (3).26 One reason for this may be that the manufacturing
industry hours per worker series that we use (for consistency with the job flows
data) exhibits greater variability than that for the non-farm business sector
in her study. Another reason for this diﬀerence may be diﬀerences between
the conditional hours per worker series implied by the limited information
approach and the unconditional hours series employed in our approach.
4.4.2 Productivity Shocks
With price-setting frictions, a positive productivity shock initially raises un-
employment.
Consider the inelastic hours case in Figure (2) panel (c). In the short-run,
25She assumes that, in the theoretical model, variables respond to shocks with a two-
period lag. This is designed to be consistent with the identifications restrictions that she
employs to recover impulse responses.
26We do not display the response for employment, but it can be recovered from our
unemployment responses - recall that deviations in employment are U/ (1− U) times un-
employment deviations, where U denotes a steady state value.
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unemployment and vacancies both rise in the face of a positive productivity
shock. Thereafter, new matches are formed in the light of the relative abun-
dance of unemployed workers and as the price level adjusts, unemployment
declines. Nonetheless, due to the persistence of the productivity shock, high
rents lead to persistently high vacancies. So in the inelastic case it appears
to be the long-run behaviour of unemployment and vacancies which generates
a downward sloping Beveridge curve under productivity shocks, see Column
(4). Separations are eﬃcient and job creation and job destruction are posi-
tively correlated, see Column (4) of Table (2). In the impulse responses, this
positive correlation manifests itself in the impact eﬀect and in the long-run
adjustment to productivity shocks, see Figure (2) panel (e). To reconcile the
evidence on the Beveridge curve with that on the correlation of gross job
flows, note that job destruction is only weakly correlated with unemployment
in Table (2), Column (4).
The introduction of hours variation acts to reduce the degree of synchro-
nization of job flows in response to a productivity shock. To see this, compare
panel (e) in Figures (2) and (3). In the elastic case, the responses to a pro-
ductivity shock are more muted than in the inelastic case. Allowing greater
adjustment on the intensive margin reduces the persistence of unemployment
and vacancies. These two features are obviously linked. The reduced persis-
tence of unemployment deviations lessens the probability of filling a vacancy
and hence the number of vacancies created. Since the long-run eﬀects on un-
employment and vacancies are less important in the inelastic hours case, the
short-run relationship between these two determines the slope of the Beveridge
curve. For reasons discussed above, the Beveridge curve takes a negative slope
in Table (2) Column (7). For similar reasons, the correlation of job creation
with job destruction is also negative. The impulse response functions also il-
lustrate the strong degree of association of vacancies and job creation and the
comparative lack of persistence in these two variables in the elastic hours case.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we build on Trigari (2005), who developed a New Keynesian
model of unemployment with hours variation and endogenous job destruction.
We use a simplified version of her model to extend our understanding of re-
allocative behaviour, as summarized by the slope of the Beveridge curve and
the correlation of job creation and job destruction. We explain the key role of
hours variation in determining the timing of separations and thus the direction
of reallocative activity. We also show that the improvement in the account of
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reallocative activity is driven by the response to monetary shocks.
These results appear to be interesting for several reasons. Our paper ex-
tends the scope of the New Keynesian literature on unemployment; there is
considerable evidence that reallocative activity and microeconomic restructur-
ing underlie business cycles and growth, see Davis et al. (1998), yet it is almost
completely ignored in the New Keynesian literature on unemployment, even
in those papers which allow endogenous job destruction. Secondly, the paper
contributes to the literature on the timing of eﬃcient reallocation. It shows
that a plausible modification of a New Keynesian model with unemployment,
to allow hours variation, while satisfying the Hosios condition, provides in-
centives for intertemporal substitution which can resolve the diﬃculties of the
standard model with inelastic labour supply in capturing measures of reallo-
cation based on gross job flows. Such a resolution may not be unique. Other
authors have found that diﬀerent features have similar eﬀects in real business
cycle and equilibrium labour market search frameworks, see Mortensen (1994)
and Den Haan et al. (2000). Our mechanism is, to our knowledge, the first
identified in a New Keynesian context and has the advantage that it can be
easily embedded in the sort of small scale model typically used for monetary
policy analysis, Gali (2003).27
Allowing realistic variation in hours leads to an improvement in the volatil-
ity of other more traditional macroeconomic aggregates such as unemployment,
inflation and even wages. Our strategy of adjusting parameters to maintain
the variability of job destruction and of output across experiments allows us
to confirm, using a diﬀerent methodology from Andres et al. (2006), that a
New Keynesian model with frictions in price setting captures a large part of
the volatility of unemployment. In a strict sense our model does not fit, since
it is unable to match the data exactly for a number of labour market and
other macroeconomic variables of interest (such as vacancies, unemployment,
tightness, job creation, wages and inflation). Nevertheless, to the extent that
one believes reallocative activity to be an important economic phenomenon,
variation in hours provides a partial resolution of the inability of models with-
out hours variation to account for key aspects of reallocative behaviour, and
may provide the basis for future research into the role of monetary policy on
unemployment and reallocation.
The lack of fit on various dimensions provides an avenue for future work.
27An earlier version of this paper, Holt (2006), adopted a framework with capital accu-
mulation. The results on the role of hours variation are similar to those discussed above.
Unlike the real business cycle framework considered by Den Haan et al., capital accumula-
tion itself does not alter incentives suﬃciently to generate a negative job flows correlation
in a New Keynesian environment when hours variation is suppressed.
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Of particular concern are the properties of vacancies and job creation. Neither
exhibits suﬃcient volatility or persistence and they are much more strongly
associated than would be suggested by the data. One possible solution to
the absence of vacancy persistence, which might break the tight link between
vacancies and job creation, would be to introduce fixed costs of posting a va-
cancy, as in Fujita and Ramey (2007b). This might be done in conjunction
with variation in worker bargaining power to raise the volatility of vacancies,
see Hagedorn and Manowskii (2005). The behaviour of wages, which are too
volatile, may be more problematic. Because of the high level of unemployment
variability generated in the model (by nominal rigidities), it may not be pos-
sible to capture wage volatility using the now standard solution of an ad hoc
wage norm, as in Hall (2005), Krause and Lubik (2007), without distorting
unemployment and reallocative behaviour. This may point to a more funda-
mental revision of contractual foundations for wages in long-term relationships
governed by search along the lines of Rudanko (2005). We leave these issues
for future research.
Finally, in our framework, monetary shocks are less persistent than pro-
ductivity shocks, and we argue the improvement in the account of reallocative
activity is due to the value of varying hours rather than creating or destroying
long term relationships given the temporary nature of the monetary distur-
bances. To shed further light on this issue, it might be interesting to examine
the intensive and extensive margin responses to other shocks of diﬀering de-
grees of persistence.
6 Appendix: Data and Calibration
6.1 Data
We attempt to match the second moments of seasonally adjusted quarterly
US macroeconomic and labour market data. Unless otherwise indicated, the
data used are available on the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) web-
site (http://www.bea.gov/) and Bureau of Labour Statistics (BLS) website
(http://www.bls.gov/). As our measure of output we use seasonally adjusted
GDP data from the BEA National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA); this
data is expressed at an annualized rate in $billions. To express this in real per
capita terms, we deflate first by the seasonally adjusted NIPA implicit GDP
deflator (an indexed series with the year 2000=100) and then by the BLS non
institutional civilian population aged 16 years and over (this series has the
code LN300000000). The BLS population and labour market data that we use
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are observed at a monthly frequency. To obtain quarterly data we compute
three-month arithmetic averages of these data. Our measure of inflation is
the percentage change in the seasonally adjusted NIPA implicit GDP deflator.
To estimate the properties of the money supply process we use seasonally ad-
justed data on the M1 monetary aggregate. This is taken from OECD Main
Economic Indicators database with code US.MANMNM101.STSA.
The unemployment rate is the oﬃcial BLS unemployment rate for those
over 16, (code LNS14000000). The Conference-Board-Help-Wanted Index is
used as our measure of vacancies. Quarterly gross job creation and job de-
struction data are available only for the manufacturing sector and are available
from Haltiwanger’s website (http://www.econ.umd.edu/~haltiwan/). We use
the seasonally adjusted data on gross job creation and gross job destruction
rates provided by Davis et al. (2006) and restrict our attention to the sample
period, 1972:2-1993:4, in common with other studies of the role of job flows,
to facilitate comparison.
Because of the sector-specific nature of the job flows data, there is an in-
herent tension in economy-wide analysis to the extent that job flows in the
manufacturing sector are unrepresentative of the economy as a whole. To en-
sure consistency with the job flows series, we use BLS labour market data
for the manufacturing sector for employment, wages and hours per worker.
In particular we use BLS data on numbers of all employees in manufactur-
ing (CES 3000000001), average hourly earnings of production workers (CES
3000000008) and weekly hours of production workers (CES 3000000007). Tri-
gari (2005) considers non-farm business sector labour market data, which is
less consistent with the job flows data, but is not at the same level of aggrega-
tion as output, price and unemployment data for the US economy as a whole.
The data for manufacturing exhibit higher volatility than for the non-farm
business sector, e.g. the standard deviation of Hodrick-Prescott filtered hours
(relative to output) is around 0.35 for non-farm-business sector hours and is
0.55 for manufacturing hours.28
28One source of controversy in the literature concerns data for total hours worked per
capita. Economy wide data appear to exhibit a trend. If the hours per capita data contain
a unit root, then authors may use diﬀerenced data in analysing the economy’s response to a
technology shock. This choice may determine the sign of the response to a technology shock;
see Christiano et al. (2004), Gali (1999) for further discussion. However, the data (and the
model simulated series) we use are HP-filtered which removes any (unwanted) trend before
moments are calculated so this debate is of less direct relevance to our analysis.
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6.2 Calibration
Those calibrated parameters of the model which are invariant across exper-
iments are summarized in Table (1). Here we discuss the targets for those
parameters and the values assigned to parameters which vary across experi-
ments. We begin with a number of relatively uncontroversial parameters. The
discount factor, β, is set to 0.99 to target an annual real interest rate of 4%.
The elasticity of substitution between goods in the final goods sector is set at
ε = 21 to give a markup of 5%, as in Jung and Kuester (2006). The value of ε
is at the upper end of those found in the New Keynesian literature. It implies
low final goods producers’ profits, consistent with NIPA compensation data.
The severity of nominal price-setting frictions is governed by the parame-
ters τ and ω. The first, τ , represents the fraction of those firms which set prices
in any given period that do so in a backward-looking manner. The second, ω,
determines the probability with which any given final good producer gets the
opportunity to reset the price of the good. This determines the average dura-
tion of a newly set price. While we could set ω to whatever value is required to
match inflation volatility, the implied price durations would be unreasonable.
Instead, we set ω = 0.8, which indicates that on average a newly set price lasts
for 5 quarters before being reset. This is within the range of values considered
reasonable from estimates of the underlying price adjustment model with ag-
gregate data, Gali and Gertler (1999). Recent evidence from micro data, Bils
and Klenow (2004), has suggested that prices may change more frequently,
on average once every six months. This is diﬃcult to rationalize in environ-
ments, such as ours, where the price setting and factor adjustment decisions
are separated.29 Given the separation assumption that we make, it is more
appropriate to target the price duration estimates obtained from aggregate
data. Following the evidence of Gali and Gertler (1999) and Christiano et al.
(2005) and others we set τ = 0.5. The deviation between model generated
inflation and the data, gives an indication of model fit along this dimension.
We follow the standard approach in the literature and set, ρZ, the autocor-
relation of aggregate productivity innovations in quarterly data to 0.95. We
allow the standard deviation, σZ , of aggregate productivity shocks to vary
across our experiments in order to target the standard deviation of output in
the data over our sample period: σY = 0.0168. In the inelastic labour supply
29Altig (2005) and others have made progress, in reconciling the new micro price adjust-
ment evidence with observed aggregate inflation dynamics, by extending the standard New
Keynesian model to allow for firm specific capital adjustment decisions. Kuester (2007)
integrates price setting, production and factor adjustment decisions in a single sector, but
he only allows for exogenous job destruction.
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case σZ takes the value 0.009, while in the elastic labour supply case its value
is 0.021. In relation to money supply growth, we adopt the approach of Krause
and Lubik (2007) and model growth in M1 as an AR1 process. These authors
use the estimates provided by Cooley and Hansen (1989). For our sample
period the estimate of the autocorrelation coeﬃcient, ρυ = 0.5, as in Cooley
and Hansen (1989), while the standard deviation of the innovation process is,
σv = 0.004. We set the elasticity of money demand with respect to consump-
tion, ξ = 1, consistent with the estimates provided by Mankiw and Summers
(1986). Then ΥM
P
= MPY is set at 17, to target average income velocity of
money over the sample period.
Next we turn to labour market parameters; we begin with relatively un-
controversial parameters concerning labour market flows and the parameters
of the matching function. The average job destruction rate is set at 10% per
quarter, λ = 0.1, following the evidence of Den Haan et al. (2000) and Shimer
(2005). We follow Shimer (2005), Jung (2005) and others in targeting a steady
state employment rate of N = 0.94, consistent with BLS estimates of the av-
erage unemployment rate.30 To achieve our target, we set the probability of
finding a job pU = 0.61.31 We follow Den Haan et al. (2000) in calibrating
the probability of filling a vacancy, pV = 0.7 to match US data. The scaling
parameter of the matching function,M = 0.654 is chosen to target a matching
function exponent of γ = 0.5. This lies within the range of plausible values
discussed by Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001), who suggest γ ∈ [0.3, 0.5]. Fol-
lowing Den Haan et al. (2000), the fraction of jobs destroyed exogenously in
steady state is set at λx = 0.068 to target a steady state job creation rate of
0.052, as estimated from plant level data by Davis et al. (1998). The rate of
job destruction and job creation will be equal in steady state.
There is little formal evidence to guide the properties of the distribution of
idiosyncratic shocks. We follow Den Haan et al. in assuming that idiosyncratic
shocks are log-normally distributed, with mean µX = E [lnX] and standard
deviation σX . Rather than allow both µX and σX to vary across experiments,
we follow the standard approach in the literature and fix µX . We then allow
30Some authors, Andolfatto (1996), Trigari (2005) employ much lower values of steady
state employment, 0.54 and 0.75 respectively. One justification for this approach is that it
implicitly allows for the presence of transitions from employment to out of the labour force.
However, it is then diﬃcult to argue that one can match the properties of unemployment
data. In addition, this approach may distort the cyclical properties of the model by allowing
the size of the pool of unemployed individuals to remain stable in the face of shocks.
31This is higher than in Shimer (2005), Jung (2005). The reason is that in discrete time
models with endogenous job destruction, following Den Haan et al. (2000), job destruction
occurs prior to search and the number of searchers in steady state is given by 1− (1− λ)N
rather than 1−N as with exogenous destruction.
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the standard deviation of idiosyncratic shocks, σX , to vary across experiments
so as to match the variability of job flows in the data relative to that of output,
σJD/σY . Increases in µX raise σX . At low µX ≈ 0 the numerical integration
over X that we use sometimes do not converge so here we set µX = −1.5, but
our results do not depend on this particular choice. In the elastic hours case
σX takes the value 0.23, while in the elastic hours case it takes the value 0.8.
Given µX , σX , λ and λ
x, we compute the job destruction threshold, X¯, and
then determine F = F ¡X¯¢−1 R X¯
0
Xf (X) dX.32 For the elastic labour supply
case F = 0.22, while it takes the value F =0.27 in the inelastic hours case.
There has been considerable discussion over the calibration of worker bar-
gaining power, the match surplus (the profits over which both parties in a
match bargain), and the value of a worker’s outside option. Hagedorn and
Manowskii (2005) argue that the results of Shimer (2005) on the failure of the
canonical Mortensen-Pissarides model are sensitive to his calibration of these
features.33 Hagedorn and Manowskii (2005) show that the volatility of unem-
ployment, vacancies and labour market tightness, key problems identified by
Shimer, can be rectified by assigning a low value to the match surplus, a low
bargaining power for workers as captured by η and a high value for the outside
option (due implicitly to home production and the utility value of non-work)
so as to give a small diﬀerence between the value of work and non-work. By
contrast, Shimer adopts the standard Hosios condition η = γ and assumes
that a worker’s outside option comprises only the value of unemployment ben-
efits. Then to obtain suﬃcient variability in unemployment and vacancies, he
introduces wage rigidity in an ad hoc manner.
For worker bargaining power, since we wish to examine the eﬀect of hours
variation on the slope of the Beveridge curve and the correlation between
gross job flows in a constrained eﬃcient environment, we assume that worker
bargaining power satisfies the Hosios condition η = γ = 0.5. The free entry
condition links the cost of vacancy creation to the match surplus (or more
precisely the profit share attributable to matches). Jung (2005) argues that,
32Because we allow idiosyncratic shocks to enter firms’ profit functions additively, we
include the constant, F , to eliminate the eﬀect of cost shocks on aggregate profits. In
Krause and Lubik (2007), Walsh (2005) this does not arise because idiosyncratic shocks enter
multiplicatively. We avoid the latter structure as it generates unreasonable idiosyncratic
hours. In Trigari (2005) this concern does not arise because additive idiosyncratic shocks
enter the utility function.
33Jung (2005) generalises Hagedorn and Manowskii’s analysis to a real business cycle
framework with capital, risk averse agents and hours choice. Both Hagedorn and Manowskii
(2005) and Jung (2005) follow Shimer (2005) and suppress the endogenous job destruction
that is key to our analysis.
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unlike the vacancy posting cost, this profit share is directly observable, at
least in principle (e.g. from NIPA compensation data). In his model, which
lacks monopolistic competition, he suggests sensible values lie in the range
[0.002, 0.05]. In our New Keynesian environment, with monopolistic compe-
tition, a figure of less than 1% seems plausible. This is consistent with the
estimates of Jung and Kuester (2006). Consequently we set vacancy costs,
κ = 0.034, to target a profit share attributable to matches of 0.5%.
Shimer (2005) adopts a value for the outside option of 40% of labour in-
come, based on the role of benefits alone. Krussell et al. (2005) argue that
such a figure is likely to overstate the value of unemployment benefits. They
suggest that the evidence favours an upper bound of 20% of labour income. As
Hagedorn and Manowskii (2005), Jung (2005) argue, rather than the replace-
ment ratio implied by benefits per se, it is the diﬀerence between the value
of work and of non-work that is of critical importance for the amplitude of
unemployment fluctuations. The value of non-work may include formal unem-
ployment benefits and the value of home production and leisure. Jung (2005)
shows that realistic unemployment variation may arise despite relatively low
formal unemployment benefits. Our approach implicitly sets benefits equal to
zero and allows the value of leisure to determine the worker’s outside option.
When individuals are risk averse and hours of employment can vary, then
the parameters φ and ψ, governing the intertemporal and intratemporal elas-
ticities of substitution can aﬀect the value of a worker’s outside option. To
avoid the use of φ, the inverse of the elasticity of substitution, as a free para-
meter, we normalize φ = 1. This normalisation is appropriate since we use σZ
to pin down the variability of output and equilibrium requires that Ct = Yt. In
any case, utility logarithmic in consumption is easily justifiable as a target on
the basis of microeconometric and macroeconomic evidence. Reichling (2007)
claims that unemployed workers spend on average as little as three minutes
per week engaged in job search. We set hours worked as a fraction of the time
endowment as H = 0.33. We set e = 0.01H which means search occupies
around 5 minutes. Then we vary ψ across experiments and allow the value of
leisure to vary as a result, with the first order condition for hours determining
ΥH to ensure that steady state hours take the value H = 0.33. Then ΥH is
1.38 in the elastic labour supply case and 5.88×10−35 in the inelastic labour
supply case. We normalize steady state consumption to unity. Then A, the
scaling parameter on the production function takes the value 3.58 in the elastic
labour supply case and 3.55 under inelastic labour supply.
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